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Prior to philosophical inquiry, many people have the intuition that the following 
moral principle—commonly known as the control principle—is unquestionably true: 
people cannot bear moral responsibility for things which are not their fault, that 
is, things which are beyond their control (cf. Nagel 1976, 138). We also generally 
assume that normal people are sometimes morally responsible for their actions, 
as our everyday moral judgments and practices of blame and praise imply.1 At 
first blush, these commonsense positions seem compatible. However, when we 
carefully consider concrete cases of human action, it becomes plain that every 
action a person performs and the effects that one’s actions have on the world 
are largely—perhaps entirely—a matter of luck, that is, due to factors which are 
entirely beyond the actor’s control.2 As such, it seems that commonsense views 
about morality and moral responsibility commit us to the existence of something 
that is, by our own intuitive lights, impossible: the existence of moral luck, that 
is, cases in which a person is morally responsible for something which was not 
completely under that person’s control. The intuitive judgements which generate 
our apparent commitment to the existence of moral luck seem undeniable, but 
granting its existence is unacceptable; this is the paradox of moral luck.
1.  Here, the phrase “moral responsibility” is shorthand for what Derk Pereboom calls “basic 
desert moral responsibility” (Pereboom 2014, 2).
2.  I will use the phrase “due to luck” as a shorthand for “due to factors beyond one’s control,” 
for it seems that the “lack of control” account of luck captures the notion of luck which is central 
to the moral‐luck debate (cf. Anderson 2019, Hartman 2017, 23–31, Statman 2019).
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In this essay, I argue that moral luck is genuinely paradoxical, and propose 
a solution to the paradox of moral luck which implies that moral luck does not 
exist. To make my case, I highlight a few key theoretical connections between 
the paradox of moral luck and two related problems, namely the problem of free 
will and determinism and the paradox of self‐creation. This essay has four main 
sections. I begin (§2) with a discussion of the traditional problem of free will and 
determinism. In the light of recent developments in the free‐will literature, I argue 
that the free‐will/determinism debate covers all three of the basic categories of 
luck discussed in the moral‐luck literature, namely: (i) causal‐relation luck, which 
obtains when one’s action is due, at least in part, to causal relations that are 
beyond one’s control;3 (ii) noncausal/actor‐extrinsic circumstantial luck, which obtains 
when one’s action is due, at least in part, to circumstances (events, states of affairs, 
etc.) external to the actor that are beyond that actor’s control; and (iii) constitu-
tive luck, which obtains when one’s actions are due, at least in part, to constitutive 
properties of the actor that are beyond the actor’s control.4 Indeed, I argue that 
there is good reason to think that the upshot of the free‐will/determinism debate 
is that free will is impossible even though causal relations (laws of nature, etc.) 
play no role whatsoever in robbing people of free will when determinism is true. 
If this is right, we must reject the standard narrative in the moral‐luck literature 
3.  Here, I break from the normal characterization of causal luck as the conjunction of luck in 
the causal relations which hold (e.g., whether they are deterministic or probabilistic) and luck in 
antecedent states of affairs. That is, I assume that causal relations seem to belong to a distinct 
ontological category of “factors beyond our control which play a key role in settling what happens 
to us.” In doing so, I grant a familiar background assumption of the contemporary free‐will debate, 
namely that states of affairs and the causal relations between them are distinct phenomena which 
can come apart (e.g., that two worlds may be exact duplicates at one timeslice but not others in 
virtue of the fact that different causal relations—causal laws, laws of nature, and so on—obtain in 
the two worlds). I also promote a taxonomy which allows us to debate (and perhaps crisply deny) 
that our lack of control over causal relations per se affect one’s status as a free and morally 
responsible agent. Notably, this conflicts with Latus’s suggestion that the entire category of causal 
luck is redundant on the grounds that “Constitutive luck covers what we are, while circumstantial 
luck covers what happens to us” (Latus 2001, echoing Nagel 1986, 113–14; Levy [2011, 40] makes 
a similar claim, but his argument seems to turn on the definition of “luck”).
4.  The three ontological categories of luck listed here are implied by Thomas Nagel (1976), 
but these are not the categories he explicitly identifies. Nagel characterizes the free‐will debate as 
a debate about antecedent “causes of action,” and contrasts this with the classes of “constitutive 
luck,” “luck in one’s circumstances‐the kind of problems and situations one faces,” and luck in the 
“effects of action” (Nagel 1976, 140). However, what qualifies as a “causal factor” or “circumstantial 
factor” is not stable in Nagel’s work. For example, both constitutive properties of the actor and 
noncausal/actor‐extrinsic circumstances are often treated as causes of action (i.e., as “casual 
factors,” broadly construed; cf. Nagel 1976, 1979, 1986); other times, constitutive luck, causal 
relations, and noncausal/actor‐extrinsic circumstances seem to qualify as “circumstantial factors” 
(cf. Nagel 1986, 174); and other times circumstantial luck is very narrowly defined as “the kind of 
problems and situations one faces” (Nagel 1976, 140), suggesting that the category is limited to 
something like “tricky situations” (cf. Herdova and Kearns 2017). Moreover, Nagel’s “fourth 
category,” that is, luck in effects of an action, is based on when the luck occurs relative to a given 
action and, so, is not a contrast class to the three forms of luck I have listed. Overall, Nagel’s “four 
categories” of luck seem more like four rhetorical “centers of gravity,” that is, rhetorically 
interesting combinations of the three factors beyond our control which I have listed, where different 
cases can be developed based on when the specified factors obtain relative to a given action.
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according to which the problem of free will and determinism is a narrow debate 
about whether causal‐relation luck—perhaps in conjunction with circumstantial 
luck5—precludes free will (cf. Hartman 2017, Latus 2001, Nelkin 2019, Sartorio 
2019).6 It also implies that we need a noncausal explanation for what makes it 
impossible—at least for beings like us—to act freely when determinism is true.
In pursuit of such an explanation, I offer (§3) an overview of manipula-
tion arguments. These arguments are typically classified as “arguments for 
incompatibilism,” but I explain how one might develop a manipulation argu-
ment in support of the anti‐incompatibilist conclusion that free will is impos-
sible—and, so, impossible when determinism is true—even though deterministic 
causal relations pose no threat whatsoever to free will. With that negative 
conclusion in hand, I turn (§4) to a problem that arises in both the free‐will 
literature and the moral‐luck literature, but is generally sidelined in both: the 
paradox of self‐creation.7 By clarifying the unique dialectic set up by the para-
dox of self‐creation and drawing out its intimate connections to the problem 
of free will and determinism, I show that the paradox of self‐creation is argu-
ably at the heart of the problem of free will and determinism. That is, I 
propose that the debate over the relationship between free will and determinism 
is, at its core, a debate about whether constitutive luck makes people unfree.
Finally, I draw (§5) on my characterizations of the paradox of self‐creation 
and the problem of free will and determinism to shed new light on the paradox 
of moral luck. I argue that these three problems are just different rhetorical 
frameworks through which to investigate the same basic metaphysical problem, 
namely that of positively identifying the type of control one must have in order 
5.  The apt phrase “remote causal luck” is already in use for luck resulting from the conjunction 
of circumstances in the remote past and causal‐relations; the apt phrase “remote deterministic 
luck” (Mele 2006, 77) is already in use for luck resulting from the conjunction of circumstances in 
the remote past and deterministic causal relations.
6.  Nagel’s suggestion (1976, 140, 148) that the free‐will/determinism debate is focused on 
“causes of action” (along with the use of phrases such as “determinism obliterates responsibility” 
[Nagel 1976, 150]) has contributed to the idea that the free‐will debate is either narrowly about 
causal relations per se, or the conjunction of causal relations and certain states of affairs (a.k.a. 
remote deterministic luck). As I argue in the final section of this paper (§5), Nagel’s writings do 
not commit him to such a narrow view of the free‐will debate and, indeed, much of what Nagel 
says fits well with my contention that the free‐will/determinism debate covers all three forms of 
antecedent luck that I have identified.
7.  The problem of self‐creation is discussed more often and more rigorously in mainstream 
moral‐luck literature than in mainstream free‐will literature. Still, philosophers in the moral‐luck 
debate often suggest that the unavoidability or even incoherence of essential constitutive luck 
provides reason to think that it is not a serious threat to the control required for moral responsibility 
(cf. Greco 1995, 95, and reply by Latus 2000, 169; Rescher 1995, and replies by Latus 2003 and 
Nelkin 2019). Such replies seem dialectically infelicitous in discussions of the paradox of moral 
luck, for apparent cases of moral luck give us reason to expect that we will find something incoherent 
or otherwise fundamentally problematic in our ordinary notion of moral responsibility. Put another 
way, apparent moral luck cases raise the worry that, when it comes to our intuitive commitments 
regarding moral responsibility, what we want is impossible (Nagel 1986, 117; Arpaly 2006, Ch. 4). 
So, the fact that it is impossible to have control over our essential properties speaks for rather than 
against it as a diagnosis of what drives our paradoxical intuitons regarding moral luck.
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to satisfy the control condition on moral responsibility.8 Although the categories 
of causal‐relation luck, circumstantial luck, and constitutive luck are not unique 
to the moral‐luck debate,9 the temporal distinction between whether the luck 
occurs before or after one’s action is. Drawing the temporal distinction between 
antecedent luck and posterior luck (cf. Williams and Nagel 1976)10 helps us to 
harness the unique rhetorical force of apparent cases of posterior moral luck—for 
example, standard “truck driver” cases in which whether a driver is morally respon-
sible for killing a child or not depends on factors beyond the driver’s control, 
namely whether/when a child runs into the street in front of them.11 Cases of 
apparent posterior moral luck are uniquely compelling ways to raise the worry 
that there is a serious problem buried in our ordinary conception of moral respon-
sibility and to motivate the need to identify that problem. Ultimately, though, it 
seems the same fundamental problem is highlighted by apparent anterior and 
posterior moral luck cases, determinism scenarios, and the paradox of self‐crea-
tion.12 I precisely identify this problem in a source‐paradox solution to the problem 
8.  This suggestion has been explicitly raised and rejected by at least one influential figure in 
the moral‐luck debate (cf. Latus 2001).
9.  All three are covered in the free‐will literature; constitutive luck is the central topic of the 
self‐creation paradox literature.
10.  Posterior luck is generally portrayed as a fourth category of luck (see footnote 4), as if it 
were a contrast class to constitutive luck, causal‐relation luck, and (noncausal/actor‐extrinsic) 
circumstantial luck. (The terms “resultant luck” [Zimmerman 1987, 376] and “consequential luck” 
[cf. Enoch and Marmor 2006] are generally tied narrowly to posterior circumstantial luck.) However, 
it seems that there is space for both posterior causal and posterior constitutive luck. Posterior 
constitutive luck seems to be at play in discussions which focus on our lack of control over the 
constitutive properties we acquire as the result of performing a given action, as in the cases of 
“transformative experiences” (cf. Herdova 2019) and discussions of Oedipus’s “moral taint” (cf. 
Hartman 2017, 136–27). Posterior causal‐relation luck also seems coherent, even if it is unclear 
whether there is any way to develop a compelling case of (apparent) posterior causal moral luck. In 
short, it seems reasonable to think that the three basic ontological varieties as luck—constitutive, 
causal‐relation, or circumstantial—can be present both before and after any given action. Neal 
Tognazzini (2011, 98, n. 6) makes a similar point, but his proposed taxonomy does not isolate causal‐
relation luck and also misleadingly implies that constitutive and circumstantial luck are contrast 
classes to antecedent luck and resultant luck. Perhaps one could plausibly argue that posterior luck 
is a fourth category of luck by claiming that it (unlike antecedent luck) results from our epistemic 
limitations in a way that antecedent luck does not (cf. Levy 2016, Hartman 2017, Herdova 2019), but 
I will not address this position here.
11.  The original “lorry driver” case of posterior luck is from Bernard Williams (1976). For a 
review of refined versions of such cases and their import, see Hartman (2017).
12.  Notably, Williams’s original work on moral luck focused primarily on posterior luck and 
posterior moral‐luck cases, and Nagel criticized Williams for this (Nagel 1976, 140). However, it is not 
clear that Nagel’s criticism hits its mark, for only apparent cases of posterior moral luck are unique to 
the moral‐luck literature and they seem to be the most intuitively compelling (cf. Hartman 2017, 129). 
Posterior moral luck cases are especially important because they get traction with philosophers who, 
given their subjective interests, are more drawn to tensions in familiar moral principles (e.g., the 
control principle) and ordinary post‐action practices of blame and praise than to seemingly esoteric 
metaphysical inquiries into the nature of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness itself. However, we 
can grant that Williams was right to focus on posterior luck in establishing the paradox of moral luck 
as a distinct area for future research, and also accept—as I will argue we should—that Nagel is right 
when he says that the different kinds of moral luck “present a common problem” (Nagel 1976, 140).
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of moral luck. In brief, this solution states that moral responsibility requires a 
certain type of basic control over one’s actions, and this type of basic control, in 
turn, can only be exercised by someone who is a genuine originator or source of 
his own actions. We generally take ourselves and others to satisfy this source 
condition, not knowing quite what it amounts to. Upon review, however, there is 
no coherent way to spell out the requisite type of “sourcehood”; the sourcehood 
we want—and generally take ourselves to have—is metaphysically impossible. This 
source‐paradox solution explains why the problem of moral luck arises, while also 
explaining why moral luck does not exist.
Although I defend a skeptical solution to the problem of moral luck in 
this essay, my central goal is not to persuade the reader to embrace my 
source‐paradox solution or, more generally, to accept that moral luck does 
not exist. My main aim, rather, is to highlight a few overlooked connections 
between the problem of free will and determinism, the problem of self‐crea-
tion, and the problem of moral luck, and to suggest that more explicit and 
rigorous work on these connections is warranted.
2. THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINISM SCENARIOS
The traditional problem of free will and determinism is often characterized 
as a dispute about the relationship between deterministic causation (deter-
ministic laws of nature, deterministic evolution, or the like) and free will, 
where “free will” picks out the type of control that one must exercise in 
order to be morally responsible for one’s actions.13 Contemporary philoso-
phers working on the paradox of moral luck generally assume that the 
problem of free will and determinism is a narrow dispute about whether 
deterministic causal relations—perhaps in conjunction with states of affairs 
prior to the action—preclude free will and, thereby, moral responsibility.14 
After pigeon‐holing the problem of free will and determinism in this way, 
13.  Because the free‐will debate is primarily a debate about the nature of free will itself, it is 
difficult for philosophers to provide a precise yet reasonably uncontroversial characterization of 
free will: the more precise one’s proposed characterization of free will, the more likely that one 
camp or another will find it question‐begging; the more generic the proposal, the more likely that 
the referent of ‘free will’ will not be fixed securely enough to ensure that the interlocutors in the 
debate are disagreeing about the same thing (rather than having a mere verbal dispute). It is now 
common to fix the referent of “free will” by tethering the term to the control condition on moral 
responsibility. For purposes of this paper, I will fix the referent of “free will” by saying that one 
has free will if and only if one satisfies the necessary control condition on moral responsibility. I 
will use the phrase “free will” interchangeably with “the control condition on moral responsibility,” 
but I am not committed to the view that they are indistinguishable.
14.  I use the term “precludes” to indicate an asymmetrical antagonistic relevance relation, such 
that “A precludes B” only if A makes it the case that B does not obtain. (Notably, this means that “A 
precludes B” and “B precludes A” are fundamentally different claims; I take no stand here whether 
there are cases in which A precludes B and B also precludes A.) This is worth noting because several 
philosophers (in private conversation/correspondence) have informed me that they sometimes use 
“preclude” to pick out a symmetrical, nonrelevance relation. For example, some philosophers define 
“precludes” so that “A precludes B” is true when A is spuriously incompossible with B.
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philosophers typically sideline the problem from their discussion of moral 
luck.15 In this section, I argue that it is wrong to characterize the problem 
of free will and determinism as a narrow debate about whether determin-
istic causal relations (deterministic laws, deterministic evolution, etc.) under-
mine free will.
Many debates now fall under the umbrella of “the problem of free will 
and determinism,” and the narrow question of whether causal relations pose 
a threat to free will is undeniably one of them. However, for purposes of 
clarifying the connection between the problems of free will and moral luck, 
we must locate this question in the broader investigation of free will vis‐à‐vis 
determinism. I will do this by focusing on the problem of free will and deter-
minism scenarios, roughly a debate in which the hypothesis of determinism 
is used to motivate an open‐ended investigation into the nature of free will 
itself.
The problem of free will and determinism scenarios begins by consider-
ing a world of a special sort. In this world, there are features—of the sort 
commonly associated with causation, laws of nature, and so on.—which account 
for the state‐by‐state evolution of the physical world. More specifically, these 
features are such that they, together with noncausal circumstances (events, 
states of affairs, etc.) in the remote past, unconditionally fix one unique future; 
the future is just an “unfolding of the arbitrarily given” (Smilanksy 2003, 
275).16 A world which fits this definite description is a world at which deter-
minism is true.17
Determinism scenarios are jarring in part because they force us out of 
our normal first‐person experience of the world, allowing us see how we—and 
all human actions—are embedded in the grand causal nexus of the natural 
15.  For example, Robert Hartman (2017, 4–5) defends the practice of sidelining the problem 
of free will and determinism in discussions of moral luck, even though he later provides several 
laudably rigorous discussions of the connections between compatibilist and libertarian‐friendly 
accounts of free will and moral luck. Other philosophers have worked on bridging the divide 
between the moral‐luck literature and the free‐will literature as well (cf. Tognazzini 2011), but (to 
my knowledge) the present essay is the first full‐fledged attempt to isolate the distinct dialectical 
frameworks around the problem of moral luck, the problem of free will and determinism scenarios, 
and the problem of self‐creation while also highlighting the need to provide a unified response to 
all three.
16.  The term “remote past” is often a technical term in the free‐will debate, referring roughly 
to those times at which the universe existed prior to the existence of the first human beings (cf. 
Campbell 2007).
17.  My use of “determinism” corresponds to its traditional use in the free‐will debate, 
following the metaphysical characterization of the doctrine provided by William James (1884). 
While there may be some dialectical contexts in which the definition of “determinism” is up for 
substantive debate, the problem of determinism scenarios is based on a thought experiment which 
consists partly in carefully stipulated details about the evolution of the world; the name we use to 
refer to evolution of the relevant kind—and such things as whether or not the description of the 
evolution of the world provided in the thought experiment is “scientifically respectable” or 
consistent with the true theory of the causation/laws of nature—is irrelevant in the narrow 
dialectical context surrounding the correlation and explanation problems of free will and 
determinism scenarios.
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world (cf. Nagel 1976, 1979, 1986). From this external standpoint, we can see 
factors which were not up to us—such as the laws of nature and facts in the 
remote past—make each of our actions inevitable. As William James poetically 
expresses the worry: “The whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life … 
depends on our sense that in it things are really being decided from one 
moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was 
forged innumerable ages ago” (James 1890, 453). It is unsurprising that deter-
minism scenarios commonly elicit the intuition that people in such scenarios 
can have no more control over their actions than they have over the laws and 
the remote past, which is to say that they can have no control at all.
A token human acting in a determinism scenario is just an arbitrary 
representative of all normal humans, so the intuitive judgement that the 
normal human in a determinism scenario lacks free will and moral respon-
sibility supports the more general and bolder claim that it is metaphysically 
impossible for any normal human to act freely in a normal determinism 
scenario. For many philosophers, this intuitive judgement—hereafter the victim 
intuition—is so strong and clear that it provides a data point which any 
viable theory of free will and, so, moral responsibility, must accommodate. 
For philosophers who have this type of “data‐point” victim intuition, deter-
minism scenarios seem to expose a desideratum on any viable theory of free 
will: it must include at least one necessary condition which cannot be satisfied 
(by a normal human at least) in a normal determinism scenario. One reason 
that determinism scenarios generate a serious philosophical problem is that 
many people who reflect upon such scenarios have a data‐point victim intui-
tion which constrains their future theorizing about free will, but many people 
do not. Those in the latter camp may deny that a viable account of free 
will must pinpoint a necessary condition on free will which cannot be satis-
fied in a normal determinism scenario. As such, whether one has or lacks 
a data‐point victim intuition to determinism scenarios marks a fundamental 
divide in the free‐will debate—a divide that reflects not only a disagreement 
about what free will is, but reveals that philosophers fundamentally disagree 
about what must be achieved by an adequate theory of free will.18
In order to understand the full dialectic surrounding the problem of 
free will and determinism scenarios, it is essential to recognize that a victim 
intuition is merely a judgment about the status of a human actor, namely 
whether the normal human in the determinism scenario has or lacks free will. 
A victim intuition, taken on its own, does not reveal precisely why humans 
lack free will in normal determinism scenarios. Once we appreciate this, we 
can tease apart two commonly conflated problems, what I call the correlation 
problem of free will and determinism scenarios and the explanation problem 
of free will and determinism scenarios.
18.  Elsewhere I call this intuition‐driven dispute over the desideratum on free will the 
common‐ground crisis (Mickelson forthcoming‐b), for there seems to be an important dialectical 
stalemate around the (in)compossibilism divide.
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The correlation problem of free will and determinism scenarios may be 
summarized as the question: “Is it metaphysically possible for a normal human 
to exercise free will, that is, moral‐responsibility‐relevant control, in a normal 
determinism scenario?” Those with a victim intuition answer “no,” thereby 
committing themselves to the view that deterministic evolution (laws, causa-
tion, etc.) and free human agents are incompossible, that is, it is impossible 
for these phenomena to co‐exist.19 The latter view, hereafter incompossibilism, 
is one candidate solution to the correlation problem; if incompossibilism is 
false, then compossibilism is true.
Notably, though, just as two things may be correlated without bearing 
a direct causal relation to each other, phenomena may be incompossible even 
when there is no deeper relevance relation between them. That is, two things 
may be metaphysically incompossible even though they are not metaphysically 
incompatible. The latter relation holds only when there is an antagonistic 
explanatory/relevance relation grounded in the respective natures of the incom-
possible things and this is what makes it the case that the two things cannot 
co‐exist.20 For example, round squares are incompossible with fluffy kittens, 
since their incompossibility follows a fortiori from the impossibility of round 
squares; there is no conflict in the nature of fluffy kittens and the nature of 
round squares such that the existence of fluffy kittens keeps round squares 
from existing (or vice versa). Borrowing from the empirical sciences, let us 
say that an incompossibility relation is spurious when it holds in the absence 
of a metaphysical incompatibility relation. The key point here is that a phi-
losopher may accept that people are unfree in determinism scenarios without 
embracing a particular view about what makes people unfree in the determin-
ism scenarios.
Once a philosopher embraces incompossibilism, they face a distinct chal-
lenge of accounting for the lack of free human agency in determinism sce-
narios. To answer this new challenge, the incompossibilist must solve a two‐part 
explanation problem of free will and determinism scenarios:
The Unmet Condition Problem (E1): The incompossibilist must pinpoint 
the necessary condition C which goes unmet in normal determinism 
scenarios;
The Underminer Problem (E2): The incompossibilist must pinpoint what 
keeps people from satisfying C in normal determinism scenarios.
19.  More carefully, this true so long as we assume that we are talking about normal humans, 
where “normal” humans have a remote personal past (cf. Campbell 2007).
20.  Likewise, propositions may be (necessarily) logically inconsistent without being 
(necessarily) logically incompatible. Notably, Keith Lehrer, who seems to have coined the term 
“incompatibilism” in his dissertation, introduced the term to pick out the view that the thesis of 
determinism is logically incompatible with the thesis that a normal human has free will. Lehrer has 
confirmed (in correspondence 2019) that the notion of logical incompatiblity he had in mind when 
he coined the term was not mere logical inconsistency, that is, “not just material conditional truth, 
but the truth of the material conditional resulting from logical and semantic relations alone.”
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(E2) has not been widely recognized as a distinct challenge. Rather, it has 
been generally taken for granted that whatever an incompossibilist’s preferred 
solution to (E1), the incompossibilist must accept the same solution to (E2). 
Specifically, philosophers generally assume that incompossibilists must accept 
that deterministic causal relations (deterministic laws of nature, deterministic 
evolution, or the like) are metaphysically incompatible with free will.21 Hereafter, 
I will use the label “incompatibilism” to pick out the narrow explanatory 
view that the type of global deterministic causation described by determinism 
is metaphysical incompatible with—precludes, undermines, destroys, makes 
impossible—free will; “compatibilism” will name the view that both incom-
patibilism and its corollary, incompossibilism, are false.22
Because philosophers have generally failed to recognize that incompos-
sibilism may be true even when incompatibilism is false, the traditional in‐house 
debate among incompossibilists has focused almost exclusively on their rival 
solutions to (E1). Given the aims of this paper, one trend in proposed answers 
to (E1) is worthy of attention. One traditional answer to (E1)—promoted by 
eminent philosophers including Peter van Inwagen (1983)—is that free will 
has a certain type of “could‐have‐done‐otherwise” condition which cannot be 
satisfied when determinism is true.23 According to these incompossibilists, the 
could‐have‐done‐otherwise condition must be understood as an actual‐sequence 
ability to do otherwise. Roughly, the idea is that the future is like a garden 
of forking paths and when we choose one of these paths over the others, 
this choice was free only if we could have done otherwise had the same 
circumstances leading up to that choice been exactly the same (cf. van Inwagen 
1990). However, in the wake of challenges to the could‐have‐done‐otherwise 
solution to (E1),24 some prominent incompossibilists have argued that the 
relation between free will and the ability to do otherwise is more complicated 
than traditionally thought. For example, Robert Kane argues that free will 
has a complicated source condition and one must exercise an actual‐sequence 
ability to do otherwise to satisfy this sourcehood condition. Kane, in other 
21.  Kadri Vihvelin (2008, 2013) and Neil Levy (2011) are among the few philosophers who 
have drawn attention to the distinction between (what I call) incompossibility and metaphysical 
incompatibility, but they do not identify the distinct dialectical value of the modest incompossibility 
claim on its own (cf. Mickelson 2015a).
22.  For clarity, let me summarize the key relations between views in the proposed taxonomy. 
Incompossibilism does not entail incompatibilism; incompossibilism is a corollary (rather than a 
defining tenet) of incompatibilism. Compatibilism is the conjunction of compossibilism (i.e., the 
negation of incompossibilism) and anti‐incompatibilism, the negation of the incompatibilism. I 
will gloss over the compossibilism/compatibilism distinction here since it is not salient to the thesis 
of this paper. For further discussion of the motivation for this taxonomy, see Mickelson (2015a, 
2015b, forthcoming‐a, forthcoming‐b).
23.  Compatibilists may grant that there is a could‐have‐done‐otherwise condition on free will 
(cf. the discussion of “classical compatibilism” in McKenna and Pereboom 2016), but they must 
flesh out this condition so that it can be satisfied by someone living in a normal determinism 
scenario.
24.  Arguably the biggest motivation for the shift was Harry Frankfurt’s development of so‐
called “Frankfurt‐style cases” (Frankfurt 1969).
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words, provides an answer to (E1) in which an actual‐sequence could‐have‐
done‐otherwise requirement is nested in the source condition on free will (cf. 
Kane 1996, 2002, 2004).25
In contrast to the above solutions to (E1), other prominent incompos-
sibilists have adopted a pure source‐condition solution to (E1). These pure 
source incompossibilists argue that free will has a necessary source condition, 
but they explicitly reject the proposal that it has an actual‐sequence could‐
have‐done‐otherwise condition (either as a free‐standing necessary condition 
or embedded in the source condition). For instance, Derk Pereboom (2001, 
2014) and Galen Strawson (1986, 1989, 1994, 2008) are both source‐only incom-
possibilists in this sense. Because Pereboom and Strawson each hold that it 
is impossible for normal humans to act freely, they are generally lumped 
together as incompatibilists and free‐will skeptics. However, this classification 
glosses over the fact that these philosophers flesh out the source condition 
in very different ways, that is, they advance very different source‐condition 
solutions to (E1).26
Pereboom holds that deterministic causation (in conjunction with non-
causal circumstances beyond one’s control) is metaphysically incompatible 
with—undermines, precludes, destroys, makes impossible—human free will. 
Put another way, Pereboom holds that there is a direct antagonistic relation-
ship between free will and deterministic causation, such that the presence of 
deterministic causation (partly in virtue of being deterministic) is relevant to 
the lack of free human agents when determinism is true. Pereboom, in short, 
accepts an incompatibilist solution to (E2). Strawson, however, is not an 
incompatibilist in this sense.27 Strawson agrees with Pereboom that we lack 
free will because our actions are ultimately due to factors beyond our control, 
but Strawson disagrees with Pereboom about which factors beyond our control 
actually do the “work” of destroying free will. According to Strawson, our 
lack of control over our own constitutive properties—that is, our constitutive 
luck—keeps us from satisfying the source condition on free will. To Strawson, 
25.  Peter van Inwagen also suggests that an actual‐sequence ability to do otherwise delivers 
an unsatisfying answer to (E1), for when someone executes a causally undetermined action it is 
“not really his act at all” (cf. 1983, 130)—and this sounds very close to the claim that the actual‐
sequence could‐have‐done‐otherwise condition is a failed attempt to flesh out the type of 
sourcehood required for free will and moral responsibility. In short, I think it is plausible to think 
that most, if not all, libertarian‐friendly attempts to spell out the actual‐sequence could‐have‐
done‐otherwise condition can be understood as (failed) attempts to flesh out the source condition 
on free will.
26.  It also glosses over the fact that Pereboom is merely an anthropocentric impossibilist (i.e., 
he holds that it is impossible for a normal human); Pereboom rejects Strawson’s unqualified 
impossibilist view that free will is impossible for any possible being in any possible scenario. This 
is not merely a taxonomical point. Pereboom’s case for incompatiblism seems to be in tension with 
his rejection of unqualified impossibilism, from which it arguably follows that Pereboom’s well‐
known view “hard (anthropocentric source) incompatibilism” is an untenable view (cf. Mickelson, 
“Hard Times for Hard Incompatibilism,” ms.).
27.  Pereboom characterizes the difference between his incompatibilist view and Strawson’s 
anti‐incompatibilist view in roughly the same way (cf. Pereboom 2001, 129).
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then, it is constitutive luck—and not at all causal‐relation or circumstantial 
luck—which undermines free will and, by extension, moral responsibility. This 
means that Strawson is both an incompossibilist, insofar as he embraces an 
incompossibilist solution to the correlation problem, and an anti‐incompatibilist, 
insofar has rejects the traditional incompatibilist explanation for the truth of 
incompossibilism (i.e., the incompatibilist solution to [E2]). In short, there are 
important similarities between Pereboom’s and Strawson’s replies to the expla-
nation problem, but there are also important differences.
We will return to Strawson’s argument for the anti‐incompatibilist solu-
tion to the explanation problem below. The main lesson I want to draw from 
our discussion so far is that philosophers who accept an incompossibilist solu-
tion to the correlation problem may disagree substantively about the solution 
to the explanation problem. Through the lens of the correlation/explanation 
problem framework, we can see that incompossibilists must use reflective 
equilibrium to develop a precise solution to (E1) that coheres with their 
response to (E2). This project leaves ample dialectical space for the develop-
ment of anti‐incompatibilist solutions to (E2). In their effort to develop a 
cohesive response to (E2), incompossibilists may appeal to any combination 
of the three basic ontological categories of antecedent luck recognized in the 
moral‐luck literature, namely causal‐relation luck, (noncausal/agent‐extrinsic) 
circumstantial luck, and constitutive luck. In other words, the problem of 
determinism scenarios is roughly equivalent to the general problem of ante-
cedent luck, rather than the more narrow problem of antecedent causal‐relation 
luck. Against this backdrop, it seems the standard practice of equating the 
problem of free will and determinism with the problem of deterministic causal‐
relation luck should be abandoned, for it conflates the problem raised by 
determinism scenarios with one of its candidate solutions.28
3. MANIPULATION ARGUMENTS
Our review of the basic logical structure of the problem of determinism has 
helped us to see that we may grant that there is a threat to free will in 
determinism scenarios without granting that this threat is (even in part) the 
deterministic causal relations which obtain in such scenarios. Let us now turn 
to the bolder claim that the upshot of determinism scenarios may be, among 
other things, that it is impossible to act freely when determinism is true even 
28.  It is also commonly assumed that the problem of free will and determinism is distinct 
from the problem of moral luck because the former is limited to a discussion of whether causal‐
relation luck completely undermines free will, while the latter is focused narrowly on the question 
of whether factors beyond one’s control may diminish without completely undermining one’s 
moral responsibility. However, this purported distinction between the problems has corroded 
over years, as evidenced by the recent the uptick in discussions of whether certain types of causal‐
relation luck might merely “mitigate” free will (cf. Todd 2011, Tierney 2013, and Khoury 2014 on 
mitigation by deterministic causal relations; for the view that probabilistic causal relations 
“diminish” but do not undermine free will, see Kane 2004, 85).
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though deterministic causal relations pose no threat whatsoever to free will 
or moral responsibility. Towards that end, let us look at a set of arguments 
known collectively as “manipulation arguments,” and consider how we might 
develop this type of argument to show that the incompatibilist explanation 
for incompossibilism is wrong.29
All manipulation arguments have roughly the same underlying logical 
structure—which includes a counterexample step, a generalization step, and 
an explanation step—but they may be developed in different ways and used 
to defend a variety of different conclusions (Mickelson 2017).30 The coun-
terexample step of every manipulation argument consists in a thought experi-
ment involving a manipulation scenario. The details of individual cases vary, 
but the basic storyline is always roughly the same: a normal human is covertly 
manipulated by another agent or collection of agents to perform a particular 
action A. For example, the argument might start off with a manipulation 
scenario in which neuroscientists have technology which allows them to cov-
ertly invoke any mental states they like in their victim, call him Vik. One 
day, the neuroscientists use their technology to cause Vik to undergo a 
process of reasoning which ends with him intentionally killing his best friend. 
Intuitively (or so the argument goes), it seems that Vik could not be morally 
responsible for killing his friend, for his decision and act of killing his friend 
was not adequately under Vik’s control—after all, Vik “decided” to kill his 
friend due to a process of reasoning which was directly caused by the med-
dling neuroscientists. The proponent of the argument then claims that the 
intuitive judgement that Vik is not morally responsible because he lacks free 
will spells trouble for compatibilists, for it seems that Vik can satisfy all of 
the purported necessary conditions on free will that have been proposed by 
compatibilists to date.31 The conclusion of the counterexample step, then, is 
that philosophers have not yet delivered an adequate compatibilism‐friendly 
account of free will.
While there are various compatibilist‐friendly replies to the counterex-
ample step (cf. Pereboom 2014, ch. 4; Mickelson 2017), let us assume, for 
the sake of argument, that the counterexample step of our manipulation 
29.  The earliest of these multiple‐case manipulation arguments are Richard Taylor’s “puppet 
argument” against compatibilism (Taylor 1966) and van Inwagen’s “freakish demon” argument 
against libertarian‐friendly views of free will (1983, 130–34); they were brought into the mainstream 
by Derk Pereboom’s “four‐case argument” (Pereboom 2001, 89). The first explicitly anti‐
incompatibilist manipulation argument is forwarded in Mickelson (2015b) and is developed in full 
in my “Mastering the Manipulation Argument,” ms.
30.  Manipulation arguments need not flesh out all three steps in the same way—indeed, some 
do not flesh out the explanation step at all (cf. Mickelson 2015b and 2017). However, a manipulation 
argument must flesh out the generalization step to some degree (however modest) to qualify as a 
manipulation argument; without the generalization step, the manipulation case is merely a 
proposed counterexample to extant compatibilism‐friendly accounts of free will.
31.  For a useful summary of the targeted compatibilism‐friendly conditions, see Pereboom 
(2014, Ch. 4). Of course, whether the counterexample step succeeds depends on getting the details 
of the manipulation “just right,” and this is no easy task (cf. Demetriou 2010).
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argument has succeeded.32 In the generalization step of standard manipulation 
arguments, the intuition elicited by the manipulation scenario in the counter-
example step is used as the basis for a generalization argument for incompos-
sibilism. In most manipulation arguments, this generalization argument consists 
in a slippery‐slope argument in which the details of the manipulation case 
are changed in seemingly irrelevant ways to construct a new case, that new 
case is then changed in seemingly irrelevant ways to construct a third case, 
and so on until the series ends with a normal human living in a normal 
determinism scenario.33 These cases lend support to the key claim that there 
is no principled difference between the victim in the manipulation scenario 
and a normal human in a determinism scenario. If this “no‐difference” claim 
is true, it supports the following conditional: If the manipulation victim is not 
free (and, so, not morally responsible), then it is impossible for a normal 
human to act freely in a normal determinism scenario. If the counterexample 
step of the manipulation argument is successful, then the antecedent of this 
conditional is true. So, when the counterexample step and the generalization 
argument are taken together, they provide an intuitively compelling argument 
for incompossibilism.
Incompossibilism is a rhetorically interesting stopping place for a 
manipulation argument. Among other things, it places a burden of proof 
squarely on the compatibilist: to save compatibilism, the compatibilist must 
identify a principled difference between the manipulation scenario and the 
determinism scenario which stops the generalization. Until an adequate 
principled difference is positively identified, the incompossibilists have the 
dialectical upper hand.34 That said, it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that incompossibilism expresses a potentially spurious incompossibility 
claim. Nothing in the manipulation argument presented so far indicates 
that there is a freedom‐relevant difference between the manipulation sce-
nario, determinism scenarios, and indeterminism scenarios. Nor does it 
suggest that there is a freedom‐relevant different between human and 
 nonhuman actors (e.g., it may or may not be that having human DNA 
plays a role in making humans unfree when determinism is true). So, just 
as we could not assume that the manipulation per se was freedom‐under-
mining in the initial manipulation scenario, we cannot simply assume that 
32.  Standard issues regarding the success conditions for a proposed counterexample arise at 
this stage (e.g., whether the targeted compatibilist‐friendly conditions are in fact met and, if so, 
whether the target audience may reasonably deny having a victim intuition). For a careful 
discussion of such replies, see Pereboom (2014, ch. 4).
33.  I say “most” for two reasons. First, sometimes no positive argument is given in favor of 
the no‐difference claim on the grounds that merely asserting the no‐difference claim adequately 
shifts the burden to the argument’s target audience (cf. Mele 2006, 189). Second, there are 
indeterministic versions of such slippery‐slope manipulation arguments (cf. van Inwagen 1983, 
130–34).
34.  That is, until the compatibilist pinpoints the difference, she must substantively lower her 
credence in the truth of compatibilism.
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deterministic causal relations play a role in making normal humans unfree 
in normal determinism scenarios.
Since there is nothing in the underlying logical structure of manipulation 
arguments that forces the generalization to stop at incompossibilism, stopping 
the generalization argument at incompossibilism is premature unless we have 
positively identified a reason to think that the generalization argument cannot 
be extended to all possible scenarios.35 Succinctly put, the standard generaliza-
tion argument for incompossibilism is just an arbitrarily restricted version of 
the following “master” generalization argument:
1. Victim Premise: Vik lacks free will, that is, the control required for 
moral responsibility.
2. No‐difference Premise: There is no relevant difference between Vik in 
the manipulation scenario and any other metaphysically possible being 
in any metaphysically possible scenario—so, if Vik lacks free will, then 
free will (i.e., the control required for moral responsibility) is metaphysi-
cally impossible.
3. Impossibilism: Free will (i.e., the control required for moral responsibil-
ity) is metaphysically impossible.
This argument is clearly valid. Assuming, as we have, that the counterexample 
step was successful, the Victim Premise of this argument is true. As such, 
the success of the master generalization argument hangs on the No‐difference 
Premise.
The No‐difference Premise of the master generalization argument extends 
the dialectical challenge posed by the standard generalization premise to all 
possibilists. That is, the No‐difference Premise of the master generalization 
argument generates an unstoppable generalization challenge: the possibilist 
must identify a principled difference between Vik in the manipulation sce-
nario and a possible being in some possible scenario in order to block the 
generalization.36 Until a principled difference is identified which explains why 
35.  Pereboom delivers a special type of generalization‐with‐explanation argument in his 
famous four‐case argument and this generalization argument has the grounds for stopping at 
incompossibilism built in. However, this is not usually how the argument is formally summarized 
(cf. McKenna 2004)—perhaps out of charity, for the explanation component of Pereboom’s 
generalization argument may be considered a weakness rather than a strength (cf. Mickelson 
“Hard Times for Hard Incompatibilism,” ms.).
36.  The possibilist may reject the Victim Premise, but to reject this premise is simply to say 
that the manipulation argument already failed at its counterexample step, and it follows that the 
generalization argument built upon the initial counterexample step also fails. Assuming (as we 
have) that the counterexample step was successful and we are at the generalization step, the 
possibilist must reply directly to the No‐difference Premise (given that the validity of the argument 
is uncontentious).
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some possible agents have free will even though manipulated Vik does not, 
the impossibilists have the dialectical upper hand.37
A slippery‐slope generalization argument may do a fair job of ruling 
out candidate explanations for manipulated Vik’s lack of free will, but there 
is a better way of defending the No‐difference Premise if one’s ultimate 
goal is to complete all three steps of the manipulation argument. The final 
explanation step of a “master” manipulation argument (i.e., any manipula-
tion argument which forwards a master generalization argument in its gen-
eralization step) must forward an adequate explanation for the impossibility 
of free will. In other words, the argument must propose an answer to both 
(E1) and (E2) of the explanation problem. To set the stage for this expla-
nation step, we can support the No‐difference Premise of the generalization 
argument using a familiar type of abductive argument, one in which we 
identify distinct independent variables and dependent variables in an effort 
to tease out precisely which phenomena are merely correlated and which 
stand in a direct explanatory/relevance relationship to each other (cf. Mickelson 
forthcoming‐b).38 One thing that makes this abductive approach unique is 
that it explicitly treats indeterminism scenarios as a means for isolating and 
assessing the potentially freedom‐undermining features found within normal 
determinism scenarios. In the context of this type of (in)dependent‐variable 
generalization argument, the distinction between determinism scenarios and 
indeterminism scenarios is first and foremost a rhetorical tool; there is no 
presumption that this distinction tracks a freedom‐relevant divide between 
possible universes.
Very roughly, here is how an (in)dependent‐variable argument for the 
No‐difference Premise might go. We could begin by selecting “the evolution 
of the physical world” as our independent variable, and take its values to be 
37.  The master generalization argument may be jarring at first, for it flies in the face of the 
common assumption that no single argument could cross the determinism/indeterminism divide; 
the standard strategy is to develop a constructive dilemma argument in which the case against 
compossibilism‐friendly views and the case against libertarian‐friendly views are developed 
independently (for serious worries about the constructive dilemma strategy, see Mickelson 
“Constructive Dilemma Arguments for the Impossibility of Free Will”, ms.). Indeed, it might 
seem especially implausible that one could give a persuasive slippery‐slope generalization 
argument in defense of Premise 2 of the master generalization argument. For one thing, it is 
evident from our discussion (above) that libertarian‐friendly friendly views of free will imply that 
there is a freedom‐relevant difference between living in a deterministic world and an indeterministic 
one. It might seem, then, that the proponent of a libertarian‐friendly view could block a relatively 
weak slippery‐slope argument by appealing to their preferred answers to (E1) and (E2) of the 
explanation problem. However, the burden of proof created by the unstoppable generalization 
challenge is not so easily met. Yes, a successful libertarian‐friendly answer to (E1) would constitute 
a generalization‐blocking condition, but there are many rival libertarian‐friendly solutions to the 
explanation problem and these candidate solutions correspond to different (and incompatible) 
replies to the unstoppable generalization challenge (cf. Mickelson forthcoming‐b). As such, there 
is room for a lively in‐house debate among proponents of libertarian‐friendly accounts of free will 
about how to correctly respond to the unstoppable generalization challenge.
38.  In theory, the abductive approach outlined here could be used to upgrade any argument 
incompossibilism to a solution to the explanation problem.
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global deterministic causation (as described by determinism), global probabil-
istic causation, and global randomness.39 By changing the value of this inde-
pendent variable while keeping all the other details fixed, we can assess whether 
changes in the way the world evolves affect the value of the selected depend-
ent variable, namely “one’s status as a free agent” (the values of which are 
“unfree” and “free”). For example, we might compare a case in which Vik 
lives in a deterministic world, a case in which Vik lives in a probabilistic 
world, and a case in which Vik lives in a world with no casual relations 
whatever.40 If no change in the way Vik’s universe evolves corresponds to a 
change in Vik’s status, that is, no change in the causal relations changes Vik’s 
status from unfree to free, then we may abductively infer that evolution‐related 
facts are not relevant to Vik’s lackof free will within the manipulation or 
determinism scenarios.41
Whether or not the abductive manipulation argument outlined above is 
persuasive, it reveals something very interesting and important about the basic 
dialectic of the free‐will/determinism debate—something which will play a key 
role in my response to the problem of moral luck (below). In slogan form, 
it reveals that if indeterminism doesn’t “help” Vik to become a free agent, 
then we should abductively infer that it’s not the deterministic evolution (i.e., 
deterministic causation, deterministic laws, etc.) in the manipulation and deter-
minism scenarios that “hurt.” More carefully, it seems that one must appeal 
to a libertarian‐friendly solution to (E1) according to which free will is grounded 
in indeterminism of some kind in order to motivate an incompatibilist solu-
tion to (E2). This means that anyone who believes that libertarian‐friendly 
solutions to (E1) of the explanation problem fail (i.e., none pinpoints a nec-
essary condition on free will which is grounded in indeterminism) has no 
means to justify an incompatibilist solution to (E2).42 In short, incompossibilists 
who reject all libertarian‐friendly solutions to (E1) must find an anti‐incom-
patibilist solution to (E2).
One obvious way to develop an anti‐incompatibilist solution to the expla-
nation problem is to draw upon one or both of the main noncausal sources 
of antecedent luck, namely circumstantial luck and/or constitutive luck. One 
might argue that antecedent circumstantial luck alone account for the lack of 
39.  As I argue in Mickelson (forthcoming‐a, forthcoming‐b), philosophers would benefit 
from using a more refined taxonomy for classifying the evolution of the world in this context (with 
categories based on the kind/amount of actual‐sequence leeway in the evolution of the world), but 
the details of this taxonomy are not critical to the general point being made here.
40.  That is, there are no strong laws of nature (Mickelson forthcoming‐a, forthcoming‐b, 
Perry 2004).
41.  Nor does it is show that the deterministic evolution in the determinism scenarios is 
completely irrelevant to Vik’s free will. For example, it is consistent with the conclusion that it is 
not the causal determination that makes Vik unfree that the deterministic relations in Vik’s world 
are actually required for Vik to satisfy certain necessary conditions on free will and moral 
responsibility (cf. Hobart 1934).
42.  The criticisms of extant libertarian‐friendly views are serious and well known (cf. Clarke 
2003, Levy 2011, Pereboom 2014, van Inwagen 1983).
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free will in determinism scenarios, but this does not seem very promising.43 
More plausibly, one might argue that it is the toxic combination of anteced-
ent circumstantial and constitutive luck which destroys free will (cf. Latus 
2001, Nagel 1986, 113–14). However, if constitutive luck is a freedom‐under-
miner, one might reasonably hold that constitutive luck alone precludes free 
will—that is, given our lack of control over our constitutive properties, our 
lack of control over our circumstances and the causal relations which obtain 
in our world does not make us worse off with regards to free will and moral 
responsibility. Indeed, this is the solution to the problem of determinism that 
Strawson and other influential figures (e.g., Levy 2011) seem to prefer. Let 
us now turn our attention to a collection of arguments which are specifically 
designed to support this explanatory view.
4. THE PARADOX OF SELF‐CREATION
The increasing popularity of source‐condition solutions to (E1), the unmet‐
condition aspect of the explanation problem, reveals that many reflective people 
are drawn to the idea that a person must be a genuine author and owner 
of their actions in order to bear morally responsibility for them.44 When we 
act, we do not merely want to express a self that has been bestowed upon 
us, that is, a self that is the mere product of factors beyond our control; we 
want our actions to express a self of our own creation. Although such a 
desire does not sound unreasonable on its face, one recurring worry in main-
stream discussions of both free will and moral luck is that the type of robust 
self‐creation or self‐authorship that we intuitively want—indeed, believe our-
selves to have—is metaphysically impossible. Worries of this kind fall under 
the umbrella the problem of self‐creation.
Prior to philosophical reflection, it may seem that human actions spring 
ab initio from the mind of the actor himself. According to Roderick Chisholm, 
Aristotle expresses roughly this idea in his Physics with the statement: “Thus, 
a staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved by a man” 
(Chisholm 1964, 177). Here, claims Chisholm, Aristotle seems to be suggesting 
that there is something within the minds of normal human agents which 
allows them to initiate casual chains ab initio, such that human actors—unlike 
sticks, stones, and bones—are the ultimate authors and originators of their 
actions. Aristotle’s buck‐stops‐here account of human action is appealing, for 
it suggests that when we are called upon to account for human action, the 
43.  Carolina Sartorio (2015) comes close to suggesting this position with her discussion of 
backward‐moving time travelers, for she suggests that their causal control over the past might 
allow them to be free even though we (non‐time‐travelers) are not.
44.  It is interesting that Strawson has consistently embraced a source‐condition solution to 
(E1) for the last few decades; meanwhile, libertarian‐friendly possibilists have increasingly 
converged on the view that there is a source condition on free will, but differ from Strawson in 
their optimistic attempts to show that the sourcehood we intuitively want is grounded in 
indeterminism of some kind.
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explanatory chains bottom out in precisely those private mental features which 
make humans agents rather than mere objects.
However, the plausibility of the Aristotelian story of human action quickly 
fades under scrutiny. When we try to make such generic descriptions of human 
action more precise, the paradox of self‐creation emerges in one form or 
another. In her recent book Aspiration, Agnes Callard frames this paradox 
as a dilemma:
If, on the one hand, the value I cultivate in myself follows rationally 
from values I already have, then I do not do any creating. For in this 
case my “new” self was already contained in my old self. If, on the 
other hand, the new value is rationally unconnected to my earlier values, 
then its advent in my life cannot be my own doing. In this case, the 
self I end up with may be new, but it is not the product of my own 
agency. Rational value‐cultivation is not self‐creation, and nonrational 
value‐cultivation is not self‐creation. (Callard 2018; emphasis in 
original)
Here, Callard provides an argument for what is often expressed as a mere 
accusation. For example, it seems that Callard’s dilemma puts meat on the 
bones of Friedrich Nietzsche’s charge, levied in Beyond Good and Evil, that 
the notion of self‐creation assumed in our commonsense notions of freedom 
and responsibility are is incoherent:
The causa sui is the best self‐contradiction that has yet been conceived, 
it is a sort of logical violation and unnaturalness; but the extravagant 
pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully 
with this very folly. The desire for “freedom of will” in the superlative, 
metaphysical sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds 
of the half‐educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate respon-
sibility for one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ances-
tors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing less than to be 
precisely this causa sui, and, with more than Munchausen daring, to pull 
oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness. 
(Nietzsche 1886)
Unfortunately, most discussions of the paradox of self‐creation are closer in 
rigor to Nietzsche’s than to Callard’s.
Callard is clear that her “dilemma” formulation of the paradox of self‐
creation builds upon the work of Strawson—the philosopher who has arguably 
done the most to establish the problem of self‐creation as a philosophical 
problem in its own right. Strawson forwards his preferred characterization of 
the problem of self‐creation under the label “The Basic Argument” (Strawson 
1986, chap. 2; 1989, 1994, 2000, 2002, 2008, 2011). This name expresses Strawson’s 
view that the basic problem of freedom and moral responsibility is the para-
dox of self‐creation, and it is the latter paradox that Strawson attempts to 
capture with his argument. Strawson has provided a variety of rigorously 
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stated premise‐conclusion versions of the Basic Argument, but repeating just 
one of these careful formulations would invite quibbles over potentially insig-
nificant details. Let us instead focus on the “core idea” behind the Basic 
Argument, which is nicely captured in the following summation of the argu-
ment from Michael McKenna and Derk Pereboom:
When an agent acts, she acts because of the way she is. But to be 
morally responsible for acting, the agent must then be morally respon-
sible for the way she is, at least in key mental respects. But if an agent 
is to be morally responsible for the way she is in those key mental 
respects, she must be responsible for the way she is that resulted in 
those mental respects. This reasoning generates a regress, which indicates 
that finite beings like us can never satisfy the conditions on moral respon-
sibility. (McKenna and Pereboom 2016, 265)
Unlike popular arguments in the free‐will/determinism literature, such as 
manipulation arguments (discussed above) and the Consequence Argument 
(cf. van Inwagen 1983), the Basic Argument makes no mention of causal 
relations or the laws of nature. Rather, it draws our attention to antecedent 
factors beyond our control which are internal to the agent, factors which—
despite being inside and, indeed, partly constitutive of the agent—still seem 
to be beyond the agent’s control in troubling ways. The aim of the Basic 
Argument, in other words, is to show us that, by our own intuitive standards 
of the control required for moral responsibility (i.e., the notion at play in 
the control principle), our lack of control over our constitutive properties is 
the fundamental threat to our free will and moral responsibility.
Although one need not state the paradox of self‐creation as a regress 
argument (as Callard’s dilemma formulation demonstrates), Strawson’s regress 
argument is illuminating—far more so than its critics tend to admit.45 Superficially, 
it may appear that the Basic Argument is offered as a knock‐down argument 
for the impossibility and/or incoherence of free will (cf. Pereboom 2001). 
However, we might instead see the argument as generating a dialectical burden 
of proof on proponents of possibilism‐friendly accounts of free will, that is, 
accounts of the control required for moral responsibility. Namely, it challenges 
possibilists to positively identify a principled way to stop the infinite regress; 
until a regress‐blocker is positively identified, impossibilists have the dialectical 
upper‐hand. This challenge, what we might call the unstoppable regress chal-
lenge, is roughly the same type of dialectical challenge imposed upon free‐will 
possibilists by the unstoppable generalization challenge of the master gener-
alization argument (above). However, the unstoppable regress challenge delivers 
a dialectical burden with its own special flavor. There seem to be at least 
two desideratum on an adequate reply to the unstoppable regress challenge: 
45.  There has been a promising uptick in explicit defenses of the Basic Argument over the 
last decade (cf. Coates 2017, Hartman 2018, Hendrickson 2007, Istvan 2011, Klemick 2013, Noggle 
2008, Kane 2009, Marmodoro and Mayr 2019, 171–72) which have pointed to serious flaws in 
standard criticisms of the Basic Argument (e.g., Clarke 2005, Fischer 2006, Pereboom 2001).
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(i) it must not stop the regress in an ad hoc or otherwise arbitrary way (e.g., 
by insisting, without argument, that the regress in unproblematic or uninter-
esting46 ), and (ii) it must not answer the regress in a way that gives rise to 
another vicious regress, where this new regress stopped in an ad hoc or 
arbitrary way (e.g., by insisting, without argument, that the new regress in 
not problematic and/or is not sufficiently interesting to warrant a reply47 ). 
So, even if the unstoppable regress challenge does not decisively establish the 
impossibility of free will or moral responsibility, it gives us a distinct metric 
by which to measure the “cost” of possibilism‐friendly accounts of free will.48
The connections and differences between the unstoppable generalization 
challenge and the unstoppable regress challenge lend support not only to the 
proposal that these are interesting philosophical problems in their own right, 
but also suggest that a unified response must given to them. This is worth 
noting, for it is well known that most of the leading possibilism‐friendly solu-
tions to the problem of determinism have elements which generate a seemingly 
vicious regress.49 In the context of determinism scenarios, having a regress 
buried in the details of one’s preferred account of free will might seem like 
a small price to pay for a unified solution to standard arguments for incom-
possibilism and incompatibilism. However, such bullet‐biting is more costly in 
46.  Strawson often remarks that his argument is frequently dismissed “as wrong, or irrelevant, 
or fatuous, or too rapid, or an expression of metaphysical megalomania” (Strawson 1994, 8). Such 
dismissive replies to the Basic Argument are dialectically infelicitous because they fail criterion (i).
47.  For example, John Greco (1995, 95) attempts to emphasize the strength of his preferred 
solution to the paradox of moral luck by saying “Even moral worth is not completely isolated from 
luck, since it is not up to me what history I have or what restrictions exist on my personal identity. 
Nevertheless, moral worth is sufficiently isolated from luck so as to prevent any paradoxes from 
arising. And so our present solution does not solve one paradox only by making way for another." 
However, as Latus points out, Greco does not show why it is a mistake to be troubled by the fact 
that we lack control over our constitutive properties; in effect, he has “merely asserted that there 
is nothing troubling about the fact that a person’s essential moral worth may be affected by luck” 
(Latus 2000, 169). If Latus is right, then Greco’s proposed solution fails criterion (ii). Along 
similar lines, Michael Moore (1997, 575–76) discusses a “character‐stop manouevre” which might 
be used in response to the unstoppable regress challenge, but Moore provides reason to think that 
this manouevre fails criterion (ii).
48.  Discussing his anti‐incompatibilist “hard luck” impossibilism position, Levy notes that his 
view “has a clear predecessor in Galen Strawson’s well‐known argument for the impossibility of 
moral responsibility,” but Levy suggests that his arguments are not vulnerable to standard 
criticisms of the Basic Argument (Levy 2011, 3–5). Arguably, though, Levy has misjudged the 
dialectical role of his arguments for hard‐luck impossibilism. To the proponent of the Basic 
Argument, Levy’s case for hard‐luck impossibilism serves as a defense of the Basic Argument. 
Specifically, it plays the dialectical role of showing that no possibilism‐friendly account of free will 
delivers what it promises, that is, an account of “adequate control” which is both intuitively 
satisfying and coherent. As such, Levy’s arguments may be framed as a rejoinder to possibilism‐
friendly replies to the Basic Argument, showing why none successfully answers the unstoppable 
regress challenge.
49.  For example, there is a “higher‐order‐desires” regress worry with Harry Frankfurt’s 
ahistorical compatibilism (cf. Frankfurt 1971, 21, Watson 1975) and regresses of different sorts 
plagues extant libertarian‐friendly accounts of free will as well (cf. Clarke 2003, Clarke and Capes 
2017, Sec 3.2).
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the dialectical context of the unstoppable regress challenge, for this challenge 
says that it is a success condition on an account of free will that it does not 
simply move the bump in the rug by trading one problematic regress for 
another. So, clarifying the distinct dialectic surrounding the unstoppable regress 
challenge makes it easier to see that arguments which address the paradox 
of self‐creation cannot be dismissed as uninteresting or unimportant simply 
because one does not immediately feel the “intuitive pull” of the 
argument.
One reason that the unique and interesting contributions of the Basic 
Argument are easy to overlook is that the argument and its key upshots are 
often mischaracterized. For example, philosophers—including Strawson him-
self—often fail to adequately distinguish between the Basic Argument and 
summaries of the argument’s key upshots. For example, Strawson sometimes 
suggests that “the central idea” of the Basic Argument may be conveyed as 
follows:
1. Nothing can be causa sui—nothing can be the cause of itself.
2. In order to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions one would 
have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects.
3. Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible. (Strawson 1994, 5)
If we were to understand these three claims as constituting a free‐standing 
argument, the argument would be so unpersuasive that one would be within 
their rights to dismiss it out of hand. There are, however, more charitable 
and fruitful ways to understand these three claims.
Claim 2 may plausibly be understood as a condensed statement of the 
conclusion of the Basic Argument. That is, Claim 2 is a quick way of saying 
that there is a necessary source condition on moral responsibility which can 
only be satisfied through an act of ex nihilo self‐creation. This proposal may 
seem absurd on its face, but it is supported by the infinite regress challenge 
of the Basic Argument. That is, it seems that only an act of ex nihilo self‐
creation would constitute a genuinely regress‐stopping action (where what 
qualifies as a “genuine” regress‐stopping action is set by the two desiderata 
associated the unstoppable regress challenge noted above).50 But, of course, 
the notion of a “nothing‐self” implicit in the notion of a causa sui is incoher-
ent; it is impossible “to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the 
50.  Possibilists are welcome to respond to this attack upon their position, of course. However, 
if a possibilist contends that he has an adequate reply to the unstoppable regress challenge, he is 
obliged to frame it as such (i.e., he must demonstrate that it adequately satisfies the distinct 
dialectical burdens this challenge places on proponents of possibilism‐friendly replies). This is 
serious challenge for the possibilists, given that familiar criticisms of possibilism‐friendly accounts 
of free will pinpoint regress problems within these accounts (for the regress problem in Frankfurt’s 
compatibilism‐friendly view, cf. Noggle 2008, McKenna and Pereboom 2016, 212–13; for regresses 
which plague extant libertarian‐friendly accounts, cf. Clarke 2003). As such, it is striking that few 
possibilists take up this challenge directly. Robert Kane is perhaps the most notable exception: 
Kane says that his libertarian‐friendly account of “self‐forming actions” is also meant to be an 
account of “regress‐stopping actions” ( Kane 1996, 74; 2002, 277).
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slough of nothingness.” Since it is impossible to be a causa sui, no possible 
action is a regress‐stopping action. In short, since being a causa sui is impos-
sible, it is impossible to satisfy the source condition on free will and, so 
impossible to satisfy the control condition on moral responsibility—which is 
just what Claims 1–3 above assert.
Another reason that the Basic Argument is widely misunderstood is that 
philosophers have an unclear view of the relationship between the dialectic 
of the self‐creation paradox and the dialectic of the problem of free will and 
determinism scenarios.51 For example, the vast majority of philosophers clas-
sify the Basic Argument as an argument for incompatibilism, but this is unten-
able.52 The Basic Argument is an argument for incompatibilism when 
“incompatibilism” refers to mere incompossibilism, but this is only because 
the spurious incompossibility of free will and deterministic causal relations 
follows a fortiori from the impossibilist conclusion of the Basic Argument—just 
as the arbitrary “incompatibilist” view that free will is spuriously incompos-
sible with fluffy kittens follows a fortiori from the Basic Argument’s conclu-
sion. What is more, the Basic Argument is an argument against incompatibilism 
when the term “incompatibilism” refers to the traditional incompatibilist view 
that deterministic causation (deterministic laws, etc.) destroys free will. In 
short, either way one disambiguates the term “incompatibilism,” this Procrustean 
label either misleadingly underdescribes or positively misdescribes the conclu-
sion of the Basic Argument.
Notably, though, the correlation/explanation problem framework makes 
it easy to convey the upshot of the Basic Argument in a meaningful way 
51.  This is also evident in the popular classification of the Basic Argument as an “ultimacy 
argument for incompatibilism” or a “source‐incompatibilist argument.” On this (outdated) 
taxonomy, the Basic Argument is in the same class as arguments for hard incompatibilism, roughly 
the view that deterministic evolution destroys free will in one way and indeterminism evolution 
destroys free will in another (cf. McKenna and Pereboom 2016, 149, Sartorio 2016, 148, n. 2). This 
taxonomy fails its users, for it misleading suggests that the Basic Argument delivers an 
incompatibilist response to (E2). However, the correlation/explanation framework makes it plain 
what these arguments do have in common. Namely, they support roughly the same kind of answer 
to (E1), that is, they all motivate a source‐condition solution to (E1). On a better taxonomy, we 
would have a class of “ultimacy‐condition” or “source‐condition” arguments, and this class would 
include all arguments which propose a source‐condition solution to (E1) (with subclasses including 
arguments for sourceincompossibilism, sourceincompatibilism, sourceimpossibilism, etc.) without 
implying that these arguments also deliver an incompatibilist solution to (E2).
52.  To illustrate the worry, here is a concrete example: McKenna and Pereboom technically 
classify the Basic Argument as an argument for incompatibilism. In their recent introductory text 
on free will, the conclusion of the Basic Argument qualifies as an argument for incompatibilism on 
their proposed definition of the term (McKenna and Pereboom 2016, 30), yet they note that 
classifying the Basic Argument as an argument for traditional incompatibilism is problematic 
(2016, 151; see also McKenna 2010). Other philosophers have noted that there is something off 
about classifying the Basic Argument as an argument for traditional incompatibilism and have 
suggested their own preferred ways of handling this (cf. Levy 2011, Vihvelin 2013, 2018). However, 
the diagnosis offered here is coupled with the only proposed taxonomy of views which allows us 
to say, contrastively, exactly what the Basic Argument does and also does not purport to show. For 
further discussion of the need for an updated taxonomy of free‐will views, see Mickelson (2015a, 
2015b, forthcoming‐a), and “Motte‐and‐Bailey Incompatibilism,” ms.
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while still showing how it speaks to the problem of free will and determin-
ism. First, the Basic Argument supports an incompossibilist solution to the 
correlation problem. Second, it provides a source‐condition solution to (E1) 
of the explanation problem. More carefully, it proposes that freedom‐relevant 
sourcehood can only be achieved through an act of ex nihilo self‐creation (as 
opposed, say, to the exercise of an actual‐sequence ability to do otherwise 
or the exercise of metaphysically mysterious agent‐causal powers). Third, the 
Basic Argument delivers a clear answer to (E2) of the explanation problem: 
the source condition described in (E1) goes unmet because the type of self‐
creation it demands is incoherent and/or metaphysically impossible. Notably, 
the truth value of determinism is irrelevant to whether someone self‐creates 
ex nihilo, which helps us to understand why it follows from the conclusion 
of the Basic Argument that the traditional incompatibilist solution to (E2) is 
false.53
In this section, I distinguished the problem of free will and determinism 
scenarios from the problem of self‐creation, and then drew out new and 
interesting connections between them. In doing so, I have shown that the 
upshot up these ostensibly different problems is arguably the same, namely: 
it is impossible to coherently flesh out the necessary source condition on free 
will, that is, the source condition on the type of control required for moral 
responsibility. We are robbed of the type of sourcehood we intuitively want 
by the lack of control we have over our own constitutive properties, a.k.a. 
our constitutive luck. To be clear, this reveals that we can grant that the 
causal relations and non causal/agent‐extrinsic circumstances which contribute 
to the production of our actions are entirely beyond our control without 
accepting that these factors play a role in making us unfree. With these les-
sons in hand, let us finally turn our attention to the paradox of moral luck.
5. THE PARADOX OF MORAL LUCK
In our everyday judgments of human actions, we assume that people are 
oftentimes morally responsible for what they do. However, once we grant 
this assumption, a review of particular cases of human action in which people 
are (by our commonsense intuitions) morally responsible for their actions 
reveals a troubling tension in our overall conception of moral responsibility. 
On the one hand, we are attracted to the idea that moral responsibility is 
immune luck. We do not, as Neil Levy points out, think it fitting to admon-
ish someone for performing an immoral action by saying “you really ought 
to have been luckier” (Levy 2011, 54). This idea is captured by the control 
principle, roughly the thesis that one’s moral responsibility cannot be affected 
by factors beyond one’s control. On the other hand, when we look closely 
53.  For further explanation of the philosophical importance of recognizing that the conclusion 
of the Basic Argument implies the negation of incompatibilism, see Mickelson (2015a, 2015b, 
2923–6; 2017).
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at concrete case of human action, it seems that every action is due mostly, 
if not entirely, to factors beyond the actor’s control (e.g., some combination 
of causal relations, external states of affairs, and the person’s own basic per-
sonality and character traits). In short, our joint commitment to (i) the exist-
ence of morally responsible agents, (ii) the truth of the control principle, and 
(iii) our recognition that luck is a pervasive part of the human condition 
commits us to (iv) both accepting and rejecting the existence of moral luck, 
that is, cases in which factors beyond one’s control affect (without undermin-
ing) a person’s moral responsibility for his actions. This, in a nutshell, is the 
paradox of moral luck.54
In his seminal work on moral luck, Thomas Nagel argues that our para-
doxical stance on moral luck is not just a logical puzzle to be solved, or the 
unpalatable consequence of some controversial theory of moral responsibility. 
“The view that moral luck is paradoxical is not a mistake, ethical or logical,” 
claims Nagel, “but a perception of one of the ways in which the intuitively 
acceptable conditions of moral judgment threaten to undermine it all” (Nagel 
1976, 139). Put another way, Nagel seems to view apparent cases of moral 
luck as a rhetorical tool which helps us “to see how deep in the concept of 
responsibility the paradox is embedded” (Nagel 1976, 146).55
If apparent cases of moral luck suggest that there is a problem buried 
somewhere in our commonsense views of morality and moral responsibility, 
it is reasonable to think that other rhetorical tools—such as determinism 
scenarios, manipulation scenarios, and self‐creation puzzles—might help us to 
home in on the exact location of that problem. Indeed, it seems that the 
tools we have discussed in this paper point us to the same solution to the 
paradox of moral luck. Namely, when we start digging into our ordinary 
notion of moral responsibility through the hypothesis of determinism, we see 
that moral responsibility requires a certain type of control (i.e., the type of 
control at play in the control principle). Digging deeper, using tools such as 
the Basic Argument and manipulation arguments, we find that one must be 
a genuine source of one’s actions to have this special type of control. However, 
when we attempt to positively state what this “genuine sourcehood” amounts 
to, we hit a wall: instead of finding a positive account of what sourcehood 
consists in, we find ourselves intuitively committed to the incoherent idea that 
sourcehood requires an act of ex nihilo self‐creation. If this—call it the source‐
paradox solution—were right, it would explain why the problem of moral luck 
arises for us and why the problem seems so intractable.
Some readers may be suspicious of the source‐paradox solution because 
it seems to be “imposed from outside” the mainstream moral‐luck literature, 
54.  Nagel characterizes the paradox of moral luck as a follows: “A person can be morally 
responsible only for what he does; but what he does results from a great deal that he does not do; 
therefore he is not morally responsible for what he is and is not responsible for. (This is not a 
contradiction, but it is a paradox.)” (Nagel 1976, 146).
55.  Bernard Williams seems to have roughly the same view, which is apparent when he says 
such things as “when I first introduced the expression moral luck, I expected to suggest an 
oxymoron” (Williams 1993, 251).
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leaving the reader to wonder whether this solution really fits the unique 
dialectical contours of the problem of moral luck. Since Nagel is one of the 
founding fathers of the paradox of moral luck, let us close by assessing how 
well the source‐paradox solution fares when it is cast as a solution to the 
paradox of moral luck as Nagel originally spelled out the problem.
To start, recall that Nagel says that he considers the “hypothesis of 
determinism” to be one among many ways of pushing people into the unnerv-
ing objective view of human action:
Something peculiar happens when we view action from an objective or 
external standpoint. Some of its most important features seem to vanish 
under the objective gaze. Actions seem no longer assignable to individual 
sources. … The easiest way to produce this effect is to think of the 
possibility that all actions are causally determined, but it is not the only 
way (Nagel 1986, 110; my emphasis).
Along similar lines, Nagel tells us that the objective view helps us to see 
that “our capacity to view ourselves from outside—encourages our aspiration 
of autonomy by giving us the sense that we ought to be able to encompass 
ourselves completely, and thus become the absolute source of what we do” 
(Nagel 1986, 117–18; my emphasis). Translating Nagel’s claims into the lan-
guage of the contemporary free‐will literature, it seems that Nagel is open 
to accepting some type of source‐condition solution to (E1) of the explanation 
problem of free will and determinism, and this is clearly consistent with my 
source‐paradox solution to the problem of moral luck.
Although Nagel clearly recognizes the rhetorical value of the hypothesis 
of determinism, he is generally dismissive of the importance of the truth‐value 
of determinism when it comes to the question of what makes it the case that 
people lack free will and, so, moral responsibility:
Once people are seen as parts of the world, determined or not, there seems 
no way to assign responsibility to them for what they do. … [W]e can’t 
on close scrutiny make sense of the idea that what people do depends 
ultimately on them (Nagel 1986, 120; my emphasis).
In these passages, Nagel seems be suggesting that there is a necessary source 
condition on free will (a.k.a. the metaphysical control required for moral 
responsibility) which is impossible to satisfy whether determinism is true or 
not. Moreover, when discussing standard views of free will, Nagel repeatedly 
indicates that both compatibilist and libertarian accounts of free will are 
inadequate—with compatibilist accounts being even worse than libertarian‐
friendly ones (cf. Nagel 1986, Ch. 7). As such, it seems that Nagel was open 
to accepting an incompossibilist solution to the correlation problem, but was 
not keen on the view that libertarian‐friendly accounts do enough to show 
how indeterminism “helps.” In the light of our discussion of the master 
generalization argument (in our above discussion of manipulation arguments), 
Nagel’s rejection of both compatibilist and libertarian‐friendly accounts of 
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free will is not merely a negative, pessimistic view about the possibility of free 
will. If Nagel does not adopt a specific possibilism‐friendly account of free will, 
he has no means to answer the unstoppable generalization challenge posed 
by the master manipulation argument and, as such, seems saddled with this 
argument’s anti‐incompatibilist conclusion. So, it seems that Nagel’s com-
mentary also fits well with the anti‐incompatibilist solution to (E2) of the 
explanation problem that is proposed by the source‐paradox solution.
Moreover, if Nagel does not accept any particular possibilism‐friendly 
account of free will, he does not have a positive account of responsibility‐
relevant sourcehood which provides an answer to the unstoppable regress 
challenge of the Basic Argument. Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that Nagel 
often focuses squarely on the problem of self‐creation (though not under that 
label) when he laments what he sees while occupying the objective standpoint. 
For instance, Nagel suggests that one thing we can see from the objective 
view (via determinism scenarios, for instance), is that the very “objectivity 
that seems to offer greater control also reveals the ultimate givenness of the 
self” (Nagel 1986, 119; my emphasis). Elsewhere, Nagel suggests that the 
paradox of self‐creation is the driving force in our dissatisfaction with pos-
sibilism‐friendly accounts of the source condition on free will:
We cannot act from outside ourselves, nor create ourselves ex nihilo. 
But the impulse to this logically impossible goal also pushes us toward 
something else, which is not logically impossible and which may assuage 
the original impulse somewhat to the extent that we can attain it. (Nagel 
1986, 126–27)
The objective view not only reveals to us our mistake in thinking that we 
are genuine self‐creators, but this revelation leaves us with an insatiable long-
ing for more sourcehood, authenticity, and ownership of our actions than 
anyone could possibly have:
I have to conclude that what we want is impossible, and that the desire 
for it is evoked precisely by the objective view of ourselves that reveals 
it to be impossible. At the moment when we see ourselves from outside 
as bits of the world, two things happen: we are no longer satisfied in 
action with anything less than intervention in the world from outside; 
and we see clearly that this makes no sense. (Nagel 1986, 117)
These two passages seem like an attempt to explain why possibilists—compati-
bilists and libertarians alike—find it so hard to abandon their quixotic project 
in the face of overwhelming evidence that their project cannot succeed.
Indeed, even when Nagel explicitly considers the relevance of actual‐sequence 
alternative possibilities to free will, he says that the sort of actual‐sequence 
alternatives that must be left open for free will would be closed off by con-
stitutive luck even if causal factors left actual‐sequence possibilities open:
While we cannot fully occupy this [external perspective] toward ourselves 
while acting, it seems possible that many of the alternatives that appear 
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to lie open when viewed from an internal perspective would seem closed 
from this outer point of view, if we could take it up. And even if some 
of them are left open, given a complete specification of the condition of 
the agent and the circumstances of action, it is not clear how this would 
leave anything further…that he could contribute as source, rather than 
merely as the scene of the outcome—the person whose act it is. If they 
are left open given everything about him, what does he have to do with 
result?” (Nagel 1986, 113–14; my emphasis)
Everything about the agent seems to be “swallowed up” by antecedent luck 
according to Nagel, “whether or not the relation between action and its ante-
cedent conditions is considered as deterministic” (Nagel 1986, 114). In short, 
Nagel seems to be saying that it is irrelevant to one’s free will whether the 
causal relations of the world allow or rule out their actual‐sequence ability 
to do otherwise; the fundamental threat to free will and moral responsibility 
is that no one has the actual‐sequence ability to be someone otherwise.56
Summing up, the source‐paradox solution is clearly consistent with some 
of the most prominent ideological streams in Nagel’s thoughts about the problem 
of free will and the paradox of moral luck. We have seen that he is sympathetic 
towards a general source‐condition solution to (E1). Moreover, Nagel’s repeated 
suggestion that part of what we want, as free moral beings, is to “create our-
selves ex nihilo” and to escape the “ultimate givenness of the self” is consistent 
with the suggestion that the source condition requires an act of self‐creation ex 
nihilo. If this is right, then the sourcehood we genuinely desire is impossible 
for us to manifest irrespective of whether determinism is true or false, and 
irrespective of what type of actual‐sequence leeway is present in the evolution 
of the natural world. This implies an anti‐incompatibilist, constitutive‐luck solu-
tion to (E2). It hardly seems far‐fetched, then, to propose that the source‐paradox 
solution addresses the problem of moral luck as Nagel understood it.
To be clear, our review of Nagel’s writings has not shown that Nagel is 
committed to the source‐paradox solution on the best interpretation of his 
writings, but nor was it meant to. Nagel’s writings on these matters is—despite 
being filled with useful insights and resonant phrases—too coarse‐grained to 
be interpreted as an attempt to deliver one precise metaphysical explanation 
for and/or solution to the paradox of moral luck. Nagel clearly recognized 
that there were important distinctions and connections between the problem 
of moral luck, the problem of determinism, and the paradox of self‐creation, 
but these distinctions and connections are not clearly identified in his writing.57 
56.  For an interesting discussion of the incoherent desire to be someone else, see Arpaly 
(2006, 127–28).
57.  Indeed, Nagel (1976, 1986) seems to cycle through the candidate solutions to (E2) 
discussed at the end of §2 (above), failing to note that these are rival explanations—at the same 
level of description—to the same problem. This strategy is rhetorically effective, insofar as it 
suggests that one of the many explanations has to be correct so pinpointing precisely which one is 
correct is “clean‐up” work, which is perhaps why it is a go‐to strategy among philosophers who 
write on free will for the general public (cf. Harris 2012).
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Still, there seems to be an adequately good fit between Nagel’s commentary 
and my source‐paradox solution that it is plausible to contend that this solu-
tion addresses the problem of moral luck as it was originally conceived.
In closing, it is worth pointing out that the source‐paradox solution 
explains why our intuitions commit us to the paradox of moral luck, but it 
also clearly entails the impossibility of moral responsibility and, so, the impos-
sibility of moral luck itself. The source‐paradox solution says that the paradox 
of moral luck arises because our ordinary notion of moral responsibility has 
a metaphysical control condition, and to satisfy this control condition, one 
must be the source of one’s own action. To satisfy the source condition, 
however, requires the impossible; namely, an act of ex nihilo self‐creation 
which would allow us to have control over our own constitutive properties. 
Since it is impossible for anyone to be the adequate source of their own 
actions, it is impossible for anyone to satisfy the control condition on moral 
responsibility, and, so, moral responsibility itself is impossible. So, if the source‐
paradox solution is correct, so too is the Skeptical View of moral luck, that 
is, the view that moral luck does not exist.58
Arguments for the source‐paradox solution are unlikely to uproot the 
stubborn commonsense intuitions which speak against it, so many people—
myself included—will continue to experience paradoxical moral‐luck intuitions. 
However, the fact that our intuitions can be resistant to rational argument 
is not a firm basis on which to build a critique of the source‐paradox solu-
tion. In future work, we could strengthen the case for the source‐paradox 
solution by arguing that resistance to the source paradox may be due to 
motivated reasoning. For instance, recent research in experimental philosophy 
suggests that people—and perhaps philosophers even more so (due the “para-
dox of expertise”)—respond in a biased way to arguments against the exist-
ence of free will and moral responsibility because they do not want to accept 
that conclusion (Clark et al. 2019).
Looking ahead, we could also flesh out the implications of the source‐
paradox solution. For example, assuming that the source‐paradox solution is cor-
rect, an incoherent source condition is an integral part of our commonsense 
notions of free will and moral responsibility. It follows that there can be no 
coherent possibilism‐friendly account of free will and moral responsibility, for 
the incoherence is built into the very data‐point intuitions which a possibilism‐
friendly account of free will and moral responsibility would have to accommodate. 
As such, the source‐paradox solution seems to imply that all possibilism‐friendly 
accounts of free will—whether compatibilist or libertarian in spirit—are, de facto, 
the output of a revisionist methodology.59 According to revisionists, our com-
58.  The “cost” of rejecting basic desert and the moral practices based upon it has arguably 
gone down considerably in the light of recent work on the implications of “living without free will” 
(cf. Focquaert et al. 2019, Levy 2011, Milam 2016, Pereboom 2001, 2014, Waller 2011).
59.  Moreover, if possibilists are engaged in de facto revisionism, then their lack of willingness 
to admit to this outright and deal with the consequences would make it reasonable to wonder 
whether they are also de facto proponents of Smilansky‐style illusionism—for if they were 
illusionists, we could not be sure that they would admit it (cf. Smilanksy 2003).
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monsense notions of free will and moral responsibility are seriously flawed. 
However, rather than seeing these flaws as grounds to abandon our commonsense 
commitment to the existence of free and morally responsible agents, the revi-
sionist suggests that we should develop a possibilism‐friendly account of free 
will and moral responsibility which departs from commonsense (cf. Vargas 2005, 
2007). Of course, once we grant that the only viable possibilism‐friendly project 
is to provide the best revisionist account of free will and moral responsibility, 
then all possibilism‐friendly accounts of free will and moral responsibility must 
be judged by revisionist standards (cf. McCormick 2013).
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that there are distinct dialectics surrounding the 
problem of free will and determinism, the paradox of self‐creation, and the 
paradox of moral luck, and have clarified the connections between them. 
Although I have framed my source‐paradox solution as a reply to problem 
of moral luck, it constitutes a unified and dialectically felicitous response to 
all three problems. Whether a person is most drawn to the problem of free 
will and determinism, the paradox of self‐creation, or the paradox of moral 
luck, my source‐paradox solution says that the final metaphysical upshot of 
these inquiries is the same: the notion of control which backs our common-
sense moral judgments (e.g., the notion of control in the control principle) 
is incoherent, so the commonsense view that we are sometimes morally respon-
sible for our actions is false.
In the end, I expect that most readers will be unpersuaded by my argu-
ments that the source‐paradox solution to the problem of moral luck is correct 
or that the Skeptical View of moral luck is true. However, I have offered 
these readers new reasons to think that some central aspects of the narrative 
in the moral‐luck literature are mistaken, and that correcting such problems 
might be worthwhile. Minimally, I hope this essay has shown that the standard 
“parallel‐literatures” approach to answering the difficult question of what type 
of sourcehood is required for free will and moral responsibility is outdated, 
and a more rigorous “cross‐pollination” approach may help us to better under-
stand—and perhaps even resolve—the problems of free will, self‐creation, and 
moral luck.60
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